This paper presents a series of arguments against the charge, common in most Asian countries, that Western liberal democracy is not suitable for countries of the East since it is perceived to be an integral element of a cultural tradition alien to the traditions of Eastern cultures. Arguments are frequently heard from leaders of some Asian countries that democracy as it is currently practised in the West cannot be fully implemented in Eastern countries. The reasons are that the cultural traditions of the East presuppose values which are contradictory to Western democratic values, or that the calls for Western democracy in Asian countries are a veil hiding imperialistic intent behind, or that liberal democracy will hinder national development and will result in the country adopting it lagging behind in the international race of commerce and business.
I will examine the presuppositions behind such arguments, and try to show that, contrary to the arguments of such leaders, democracy is not necessarily bound to a particular cultural tradition, including Western, liberal one. Thus the reaction against the call for democracy should be seen in clearer light as a reaction against perceived threats to the legitimacy of those leaders themselves. These topics will be the matter of the first section of the essay.
However, though democracy is not necessarily based on a particular cultural tradition, it is not essentially tied to a fixed ontological foundation or universal rational principles either. The second section then presents an argument for the conclusion just stated, based on John Rawls' recent proposal that democracy and justice are political conceptions. Democracy is a system of government best suited to a form of socio-economic life and a particular vision of the good. This form is not the only one possible and is not the best regardless of historical, social, or cultural contexts, but as forms of socio-economic life of nations in the world turn out to be more substantially the same--the form which, I argue, requires democracy--democracy is then justified.
In the third and last section, a brief suggestion for the continuing struggle for greater democracy in Thailand will be offered based on the arguments presented before. A country like Thailand has to find its own way, according to which, as Thailand is becoming more and more involved in interactions among nations, the resulting form of government, while clearly retains much that is peculiar to the historical development and other circumstances of the country, cannot diverge too much from what the world community finds acceptable.
In this paper I present a series of arguments against the charge, common in most Asian countries, that Western liberal democracy is not suitable for countries of the East since it is perceived to be an integral element of a cultural tradition alien to the traditions of Eastern cultures. Arguments are frequently heard from leaders of some Asian countries that democracy as it is currently practised in the West cannot be fully implemented in Eastern countries. The reasons are that the cultural traditions of the East presuppose values which are contradictory to Western democratic values, or that the calls for Western democracy in Asian countries are a veil hiding imperialistic intent behind, or that liberal democracy will hinder national development and will result in the country adopting it lagging behind in the international race of commerce and business.
I will examine the presuppositions behind such arguments, and try to show that, contrary to the arguments of such leaders, democracy is not necessarily bound to a particular cultural tradition, including Western, liberal one. Thus the reaction against the call for democracy should be seen in clearer light as a reaction against perceived threats to the legitimacy of those leaders themselves. These topics will be the matter of the first section of the essay.
However, though democracy is not necessarily based on a particular cultural tradition, it is not essentially tied to a fixed ontological foundation or universal rational principles either. The second section then presents an argument for the conclusion just stated, based on John Rawls' recent proposal that democracy and justice are political conceptions.[1] Democracy is a system of government best suited to a form of socio-economic life and a particular vision of the good. This form is not the only one possible and is not the best regardless of historical, social, or cultural contexts, but as forms of socio-economic life of nations in the world turn out to be more substantially the same--the form which, I argue, requires democracy--democracy is then justified.
In the third and last section, a brief suggestion for the continuing struggle for greater democracy in Thailand will be offered based on the arguments presented before. A country like Thailand has to find its own way, according to which, as Thailand is becoming more and more involved in interactions among nations, the resulting form of government, while clearly retains much that is peculiar to the historical development and other circumstances of the country, cannot diverge too much from what the world community finds acceptable.
I
The arguments mostly presented by Asian leaders as negative reactions against the call for greater democratization in their countries by their own people could be divided roughly into three major types. The first one is based on the premise that full implementation of Western liberal democracy would entail a set of values which, since they are contradictory to some Eastern values, would result in loss of cultural identity. Let us call this first one "Argument for Preservation of Indigenous Values," or PIV for short. The second argument is based on the charge that demands for democratization in Eastern countries are veiled threats of imperialism, so let us call this one "Argument against Perceived Imperialist Threat," or PIT. The third argument contends that genuine, liberal democracy will lessen the effectiveness of the country in the international arena of trade and commerce. Let us call it "Argument on Competitive Efficiency," or CE. These arguments will be examined in turn.
The first argument against democracy, PIV, is actually a kind of cultural relativism. It is based on the premise that cultural entities are distinct and bridges between them are only possible in terms of one understanding another, but without the possibility of objective comparison between the two. However, since cultures are not fixed and stabilized, but fluid and dynamic, cultural entities are not distinct from one another and boundaries between them not clearly marked . The web of assumptions and beliefs together constituting a culture changes considerably over time. It also varies according to localities, population, technological advances, religions, and so on.
To illustrate, the referent of the description `the Thai culture' varies according to many factors, one of which is the locality of the people. At present, when the description `the Thai culture' is used, Thais are often reminded of cultural practices of the elite members of the court, consisting of elaborate dances, dramas, literature written in ornate language, and so on. An ordinary Thai would not think of folk dances performed by peasants in the North, for instance, as the best example of Thai culture, since the cultural practices of the court represent the "essence" of the culture, so to speak. This consciousness of court culture as the representative of the whole culture or as the prime example of it stems from the total domination of resources such as education and the economy by the elite court. The domination is so strong that an ordinary Thai equates "culture" with the court. Furthermore, the domination also results in Thais far removed from the court trying to emulate it as much as possible. The emulation often comes in form of folk dramas depicting the lives of royals. The emulation, however, affects only outward elements, but the content is rooted in the peasant's own world view. The cultural practices of the peasants might even contain elements which are directly critical and satirical of the court, such as servants outwitting their masters--a perennially popular theme among folktales and dramas. It is clear, then, that the court culture is not representative of the whole of Thai culture, since the elites comprising the court are only a tiny fraction of the population, and it is only by sheer domination that the culture of the court came to be perceived as the best of all the Thai cultural practices, which are very diverse.
What this example shows is that the belief that the whole culture can be referred to the same way an individual can is incoherent, for it is always difficult to mark precisely where one culture ends and another begins, except perhaps by identifying one culture with one political entity or some such institutionally defined entity. (Which is the true Thai culture--the culture of the elite court, the local cultures of the regions, cultures of those who do not call themselves Thai but share almost identical cultural practices, or any combination of these?) Hence, the assumption of the proponents of PIV-type arguments loses its force, for cultural entities are not as neatly individuated as the premise of PIV seems to presuppose.
Nor does the web of assumptions and beliefs constitutive of a culture stay the same over time. Contemporary Thai culture is different from the culture as it was before World War II, for example, and is very different from the culture of the pre-modernization era. Another reason in favor of PIV is that the adoption of a foreign idea like democracy will result in loss of cultural identity. If we adopt Western liberal democracy, so the imagined proponent of PIV might say, we would then lose a large part of who we are. This argument here would indeed carry weight if the move from the conclusion really followed from the premise. But it is at least doubtful if the move is warranted. Countries of Western Europe, for instance, differ considerably in histories, temperaments, preferences in food and drink, and so on. These differences continue despite those countries being democratic and liberal. Thus most French prefer wine to beer, while most Germans prefer the opposite, and the two nations enjoy distinctive national cuisines which clearly show their identities. Neither French nor German identity, however, is threatened by the system of government they adopt. The differences between the two cultures are deep rooted, but they do not preclude the possibility of the two countries being both democratic. In a liberal culture, the political system does not enter the realm of practices constitutive of cultural identities. The liberal culture separates the domain of the political and that of private lives. The political domain represents, according to John Rawls, an "overlapping consensus" of widely differing sectors in a society.[2] Adopting a political system no more constitutes an identity of a culture than voting for a political candidate constitutes personal identity of the voter.
The proponents of PIV might counter that the Western liberal tradition is so ingrained in such countries as France and Germany that the cultural identities of these two nations do not seem to be threatened, whereas traditions of, say, Thailand or Singapore, would be jeopardized if this were the case, for liberal democracy is alien to these cultures. Cultural or personal identities, nonetheless, are not threatened by democracy, as the above example illustrates. Only those traits of cultures, such as the practice in old Siam of burying people alive in the ground on which a royal building is to be erected so that the spirits of those buried will forever guard the place, which are patently unacceptable to modern sensibility, are weeded out in order that the modern form of life of the Thais--or of any Asian people for that matter--could emerge.
Values which the proponents of PIV arguments try to preserve are mostly those which emphasize, for instance, obedience to the elders, submission of individuality for the sake of the group, unity of the whole instead of endless bickering, and so on. The value that strongly promotes obedience to the elders, especially one's parents, is justified on the basis that "Fathers know best." This justification is also expanded to rationalize ruling of the state. However, for this argument to work, the political and cultural context has to be vastly different from that in the contemporary age. The sort of political and cultural entity where such argument works best is one in which rulers claiming to possess superior moral virtues and knowledge are at least believed by his subjects really to possess the virtues. For such rule to be possible education has to be extremely rare and limited only to the elites, and the structure of rationalization of such rule, when judged from the point of view of the present, relies on a particular belief system of the subjects, for example the belief in divine power. On the contrary, it is increasingly difficult now to see that this kind of value and its derivatives need to be preserved as a foundation for governing systems of contemporary Asian countries. The reason is that the belief system which sustained the rule of the fathers or divine kings in the past is now falling apart in the wake of modern life, constituted in part by relation among people that transcends national and cultural boundaries. This system of relation engenders in turn the awareness that the divine sanction of kings are merely beliefs, and when modern life constantly forces changes and revisions of beliefs, this core belief in the legitimacy of the rulers by virtue of their moral and epistemic superiority comes to be regarded as a relic from the bygone era. And since the belief in the rule of the fathers or divine kings becomes used as the modern rationalization of the rules of oligarchic elites who claim superior knowledge and moral virtues, this modern form of belief is untenable.
The second argument, PIT, is easier to refute. The calls for greater democratization in a country typically do not come from outside. In fact struggles for democracy seem to be by factions of the population of the country. Foreign intervention, if exists at all, ultimately works only if it is supported by the majority of the people in that country themselves. Foreigners watching the international news might sympathize with the hard struggles they see, but they generally limit their action only at calling their representatives to impose some kind of sanctions or protests on the country. These calls might generate some action on the part of the legislators, but to get really into action is extremely difficult, as the attempts by the human rights activists to pressure the US government to impose trade sanctions on China indicate. The government's action is hampered by business groups who stand to lose if trade with China is interrupted. Thus, full scale sanctions on China as a retaliatory means against violations of human rights become difficult to realize. The upshot is that threats of foreign intervention are more apparent than real. But when the interests of rights activists and business groups match, such as when Iraq invaded Kuwait threatening to cut off the world's supply of oil, there is absolutely no pressure against economic and armed intervention on the part of the US and its allies.
Therefore, threats of imperialism incurred by implementation of democracy are nothing more than a means to arouse nationalistic feelings and blur the sight of the people so that they fail to see the need for democracy. The argument is particularly employed by regimes of countries where colonialism remains in living memory, and thus the uses of such phrase as `expansionism,' `imperialism,' and `colonialism' resonate strongly in the collective psyche of the people. But if these people realize that democracy can come only from within themselves and cannot be handed down by those in power without sometimes bloody struggles, then they will know that struggles for democracy is a totally different matter altogether from foreign control of lives and minds of the people, or from threats of neo-colonialism. The people know that they themselves have to take matter in their hands and can expect no foreign help; indeed they might reject such foreign help beyond a very narrow, clearly defined limit for fear of later infiltration and possible loss of autonomy.
Proponents of the third argument against democracy, CE, typically say something of this kind: "Democracy cannot be justified for Asian countries because it is not conducive to economic success. In a democracy there are too many voices, too many opinions, and too many directions to which policy making is being pulled; hence it appears to be an archaic system not suitable in the international arena of economic competition among nations where efficiencies in management, production, and so on need to be at the maximum." What is presupposed by this argument is that running a country structurally resembles running a business corporation. However, it is amply clear that the analogy does not work. A country is far too varied and pluralistic to be managed as a corporation, and even such a country with great homogeneity as Japan seems to become more varied when the younger generations refuse to be molded as their parents were before. A country contains far too many constituencies, too many conflicting interests, and dissenting views owing in part to its inclusion of every person born into it and for this reason it is very difficult for a leader to manage it the way she manages a business. A business corporation typically has power over the selection of who is going to be its employees, and this is not the case for a country. Furthermore, visions of the good among citizens of a country might conflict with that of a leader-manager of a country, who wants to take the country along the path of a successful business enterprise. The trade offs between the vision of life of the people and what is required for the country to be successful in international economy may be too much for the people themselves, and they have rights to find the most suitable way to achieve their collective goal.
To sum up: The first argument, PIV, purports to show the discrepancy of democracy and the cultural traditions of the East. It suffers from the misguided presupposition that cultures are distinct, self contained and self subsisting entities. Not only are the boundaries between cultures fuzzy, but the constitutive set of beliefs and assumptions on which an entire culture is based is not immune to revision and adaptation in the face of changing circumstances and practical contexts. The second argument, PIT, results from the perception of the leaders who, in trying to counter the increasing tide of calls for greater freedom and democracy from their own people, propose that these calls are not genuine but are organized and supported by leaders who are "puppets" of foreign regimes. This argument falters because these calls for greater democracy and freedom would not have the force so great that the leaders feel threatened if they were not supported by the majority of the people, and such support clearly refutes the leaders' own argument. The third argument, CE, is based on a belief that there is only one correct vision of good life, that of competing and winning the competitive game of commerce. This, however, is a result of viewing a country as a business corporation owing its survival and prosperity to its success in competition. However, a country is far too pluralistic for the analogy to work, and the competition and engagement in the international economic arena clearly does not require that the country itself be ruled by a non-democratic, authoritarian regime.
II
Arguments purporting to show that democracy is unsuitable to Eastern countries are, then, unsuccessful. Democracy is not necessarily an alien system from an alien tradition imposed on the countries of the East. Struggles for greater democracy by Asians witnessed by the whole world--in the Philippines, when the Marcos regime was toppled in 1986, at Tiananmen Square in China, when students led a mass of people against the army in 1989, and on Ratchadamnoen Avenue in Bangkok, Thailand in 1992, when unarmed citizens rose up and battled soldiers with automatic rifles and tanks--attest to the fact that democracy has represented the aspirations of the citizens in these countries for better lives. The actual outcomes of such struggles might not have been perfect, and there are undoubtedly many more obstacles to overcome before genuine democracy is fully realized, but these struggles are important steps toward building a fairer society by the citizens themselves.
The democracy for which citizens of these countries fight for, however, is not based on ontological foundations or universal principles of reasons. In "Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical," John Rawls presents a case for consideration of justice and democracy as not founded on philosophical theories which are, according to him, within the domains of comprehensive moral doctrines having no roles to play in an actual conception of justice among free and equal citizens of a society.[3] The conception is, on the other hand, based on a system of cultural relations constitutive of the political culture of that society, which in Rawls' case is the American constitutional regime. An implication of Rawls' argument, then, is that a socio-cultural entity has to find its own way toward its desired system of government and justice. If Rawls' argument is valid, then democracy cannot be founded on ontological or metaphysical foundations such as those of right-based theories or theories about the nature of the self,[4] or it represents the convergent point, each in its own way, its own language, of many comprehensive moral doctrines, each seeing its own way of realizing how to coexist with others who do not share the same basic assumptions and values.
However, while democracy is not based on metaphysical foundations, it does not follow that only the tradition of Western constitutional regimes alone is capable of producing the democratic thought and system of government. Rawls' argument is based on the assumption that, in order for the political conception of justice and democracy be possible as a system by means of which every constituent of a society could live together in a just and fair manner, each constituent has to share a set of beliefs which include, among other things, the belief in the equality of all as respectable rational agents capable of exercising moral power. This belief, according to Rawls, is embedded within the tradition of American constitutional regime and no argument in his article purports to justify it.[5] Thus, for an activist striving for greater democracy within a tradition where the belief in equality of all as rational agents has not taken firm root, where the belief in the inequality of persons is deeply ingrained, and where the conception of justice and fairness is based on such ontological and religious foundations as divine justice or justice reflected by religious principles, to implement Rawls' idea becomes difficult indeed. In such a traditional society, Rawls' original position cannot take place, for no one would take away his or her own position, and no one would think the idea of the original position a feasible one. The privileged do not want to quit their position and enter into the agreement based on the original position, for they believe that their position is inalienable and "just" because it accords with the framework of reference inherent to their traditional culture. When a party firmly believes that another is lesser than it in terms of intelligence or moral capability, Rawls' proposal does not get off the ground. The problem, then, for the activist is to try to make a case for the realization of the need for the original position so that a fair and just society come to be for her and her fellow citizens.
Such a way of realizing the foundation of liberal democracy, therefore, will have to start with arguments showing that people are free and equal and equally capable of moral judgement. That is to say, the beliefs presupposed by Rawls' participants at the original position have to become those presupposed by Thais entering into the bargaining for political power also. In the last section, I have tried to show that democracy is free from such constraints as cultural traditions and competitive efficiency; thus to found the democratic tradition in Thailand requires, first, a clear understanding by the people that it is really needed, and the people need believe that they are themselves indeed free and equal.
One might try to accomplish this by placing democracy on a fixed ontological scheme. Thus one argues that the democratic conception which opens up the possibility for all sides to engage in rational debates is itself based on some kind of ontological scheme. But since schemes are not independent from the language describing it, and since the language itself is not free from the cultural milieux embodying it, schemes are then contextualized,[6] making the attempt to base democracy on any kind of fixed, ontological principles incoherent. Therefore, the call for democracy has to take into consideration the particular web of assumptions constituting a cultural tradition where the democracy is to be founded. Democracy ought to be founded and maintained in such culture not because it accords with scientific or universal reasons apart from cultural contexts, but because it offers the best alternative for the people when they see themselves as free and equal in terms of explanation offered from within their own culture itself.
However, relativism is not a consequence of such a conception. On the contrary, the search for non-ontological foundation needed for a struggle for democracy, while rooted in the traditions of the society itself, has to look forward and beyond those mere traditions for new perspectives and horizons which would make it possible for inhabitants of those cultural traditions to live in a fair and just society. What is gained from looking across the pre-set boundaries is a distance which enables one to judge one's own culture objectively.[7] The struggles are not based on a realization of the "truth" of a set of beliefs in one culture understood by adherents of another, but a practical one of seeing that, in order for a particular way of life to be possible, a particular way of governing is required. The way of life of a culture, for example that of Western liberal democracy, which adherents of another are trying to emulate, is not intrinsically "better" or based on a "true" foundation, but is regarded to be suitable for one type of living whose desirability has come about by virtue of developments in external circumstances. Materialization of this conception doubtlessly requires that the majority of the society in question agree that the way of life to be adopted represents the goal for them to be achieved. This recognition is clearly afforded by the possibility of judging beyond one's own cultural milieu and hence by seeing that, external circumstances being what they are, there is no alternative except democracy. This realization has in fact been the motive behind contemporary Asian struggles for democracy. For example, the Thais fighting soldiers with bare hands in 1992 visualized a kind of society they wanted--a society in which the military know their own place and in which political power is shared equitably. They realized that their own cultural tradition, if allowed to remain stifled and cut off from developments outside, would miserably fail to provide the kind of life they want to live and would only serve as a basis on which rationalizations will be given for the leaders to perpetuate their unjust rules. Thus, they are willing to risk their lives fighting for such a conception. The fight would not have been conceivable had it not been possible that the people compared and judged from among differing cultural traditions. By doing so the Thai people are actively creating a new tradition for themselves, and the process is still continuing with vigor.
Comparison and evaluation of cultures is made possible in contemporary world by such advances as international news, universal education and international mass media. Awareness of other cultures results in the inhabitants of a cultural entity being able to distance themselves from their received, hitherto uncritical, assumptions of their own culture. They witness actual political deliberations and processes such as national elections, and begin to compare with their own tradition. They might have traditionally believed that people are not equal in terms of capability or suitability to rule, or in terms of karmas, but when they witness democratic processes going on in other countries, which are based on social cooperation of free and equal citizens, they come to have an objective look at their own tradition. Understanding what they see, the people begin to see themselves in those deliberative processes and begin to realize that either the members of the democratic polity they witness are equal as privileged rulers, or they are equal as common citizens. Either way the members of the polity based on ingrained inequality between rulers and subjects will see that the distinction between the two classes is clearly not necessary for a successful rule. They eventually come to see that in their own polity distribution of political power is unjust since it is monopolized to only a group of leaders who hold on to their power. As the people do not see themselves as any different, as rational agents capable of making moral decisions, from the leaders who rule on inequality, they will typically question the rationale behind such inequality and, when circumstances are favorable, begin to struggle for greater participation in public policy making and for genuine democracy. In sum, then, the evaluation of one's own political culture is not possible because there is a culture based on true foundation, but because of the practical reason that the people themselves simply want live differently from the way they used to live in the past.
This reorientation in fundamental conception of how society is to be constituted is possible because democracy seems to be the only possible choice given the world circumstances at the moment. This possibility of reorientation does not preclude that democracy might not be suitable in some other global circumstances, for example in an agrarian society where the mass is illiterate and is under constant threat of natural calamity or famine, where each group of people is cut off from one another and has to make a meagre living from the land--a situation which requires a strong, decisive and sometimes ruthless ruler. This kind of society, however, does not exist any longer in Thailand or elsewhere.
To conclude: I argue that democracy, though not essentially tied to a particular cultural tradition, nevertheless has to come from within the traditions of a cultural entity themselves. This apparent contradiction is explained by the proposition that cultures are not static but fluid and dynamic in the sense that the web of constitutive assumptions and beliefs are always adaptable and revisable in changing times and circumstances. What makes democracy the only choice at this time is due to several factors, including globalization of economic cooperation, the emergence of cosmopolitan culture where local cultures become pieces in a giant mosaic making one large picture, which is made possible by the emergent awareness that one's own culture is just one possibility among many.
III
A recipe for the change toward greater democracy for Thailand, then, has to start from the reorientation in the thinking of the Thai citizens; that is, they need to come to see that they are indeed free and equal as participating members in a polity where no one gains unfair advantages due to accidents of birth, wealth, or other social positions. The reorientation has to come from within conditions unique to the experience of the Thais and could be generated by a realization that their core belief system--the beliefs that together constitute being Thai--can, after some translation or interpretation, provide a foundation for a democratic society.
One might, however, try to accomplish the task of bringing democracy to Thais by attempting to base the beliefs in freedom and equality on Buddhist teaching. Thus, a typical way of argument on this line would be this: Since Buddhism actually promote freedom and equality, as for example evidenced in the Buddha's abolition of the caste system and his showing of ways to achieve non-violent resolution of conflicts, Buddhist teachings could then promote democracy by engendering these beliefs, which are then practiced in the political arena. This line, however, would be possible only insofar as it is firmly kept in mind that Buddhist teachings as such cannot enter directly into the political arena, since the other constituents in the society such as the Muslims do not share the same tradition and beliefs as Buddhists. The Muslims perhaps will not accept the Buddha's teachings solely because the Buddha taught them, but probably because what he taught is true, and for them to be convinced that the teachings are indeed true perhaps requires that the teachings be translatable into the language of their own tradition and thus justifiable by the resources and assumptions of their tradition.[8] That is, the teachings of Buddhism have to be evaluated on independent ground if they are to be acceptable to those who do not already profess the religion. Hence, the basis on which the differing parties in the political arena could conceivably agree on cannot be an element in a religion or what Rawls calls a comprehensive moral doctrine, but on the practical realization that, were this not be put in practice, a just and fair society would not be possible.
Therefore, for the proposals of Buddhism to be acceptable to the non-Buddhist minority, they have to be translated into the languages of the other traditions, and those languages have to be translated for the Buddhists too for the same reason. In fact Thais have a traditional saying that all religions are of equal merit, for all aim at teaching people to be good. The content of the saying is actually what is required for building a society in which pluralistic elements could exist side by side without violent conflicts. The saying is a clear expression of the Thais' ingenuity and genuine desire to live with widely differing traditions, which has been one of the outstanding characters of the people. This saying does not stem from the teachings of orthodox, Theravada Buddhism; it stems from the unique nature the Thai people themselves.
The old saying has a profound and far reaching implication. It neither entails that there can be one true religion, nor that there can be a comprehensive moral doctrine to which everyone should ultimately profess. On the contrary, the saying implies a practical realization that all religions serve the same purpose in instilling moral discernment in the people, and the actual content of each religion is irrelevant. The moral discernment is beneficial in the sense that people of all religions could then live together without serious conflicts. If all sides see that the others are also good, as good as they themselves, then violent conflicts are considerably reduced. If all sides see in the others good points and agree that resorting to violence is not conducive to the well being of all, then a kind of harmony will be created within a pluralist society. Thus, differences here will be settled by a process based on the recognition of all sides as good and rational--a foundation for genuine democracy.
The realization that all religions are equally good could then be carried over into the political arena so as to become the awareness that reasonable comprehensive moral doctrines are equally good at instilling the sense of civic duties and attitudes, or that moral doctrines and religions are irrelevant to politics in that people holding different moral conceptions and religions do not bring those into the political arena. Purists in one of the religions might object to this, asserting that the situation is paradoxical. How is it possible, such a purist might ask, that the religious teachings are not to be carried into politics? What would guarantee, then, that politics not become immoral? The purists, however, have to realize that a necessary condition for different people to be able to live together in a society where each could prosper is that the actual content of each religion professed by the people does not carry over into the political arena. Moreover, there is an effective control of the behavior of politicians which is not based on religious doctrine by constantly watching them perform and institute means of making them accountable for their actions and decisions.
Therefore, the task for democrats in Thailand is to foster this living tradition of tolerance and to try to create a process whereby differences among all sectors could be fairly and equitably adjudicated in such institutional settings as public hearings and other measures. For this to be possible the traditional saying has to be carried over into political deliberations, and the rule of law which is formulated through just processes beneficial to all is necessary. In fact the Thai people at the moment are grappling with the problem of what constitutes fair and equitable procedure of allotting political power and other social goods, which they have continually done so for many years. The debate on the constitution which has been going on for decades attests to the fact that Thais are searching for a way to settle conflicts of interests which is agreed to by all sides; hence it appears Thais are evidently in the process of finding the basis of democracy which is recognizably their own.
The debate and struggle on the constitution is reflected in a hard struggle continually being waged between the bureaucrats and military on the one hand, and the emerging middle classes on the other. The middle class stands to lose a great deal if the country remains undemocratic, and the bureaucrats are being forced to yield more and more ground to the middle class. The successes of the middle class against the power of the military and the bureaucrats, who have monopolized political power for decades, are perhaps due to the fact that Thailand today is more than ever directly involved in international trade; it has become a full time player in the globalized arena where the rules of the game are clearly specified, and it is dependent on foreign markets and capital. Thus actions violating these rules will increase the chance of the country being ostracized and foreign capital being withdrawn, which will greatly harm the country.
However, the struggle between the middle class and the bureaucrats and the military belies the obvious fact that the majority of Thai people, who either eke out livings as farmers outside the capital or toil as cheap laborers in industrial areas, are still abjectly poor and very inadequately educated. Democracy will not be possible if the majority are excluded from the process. What is to be done urgently is that their condition of living be improved and for that to be possible adequate quality education is needed for all. Education will both improve their skills so they can earn more and will make them aware of their roles, rights, and duties in a democratic polity at the same time. Without this special attention to the poor majority, democracy in Thailand is doomed, no matter how much the educated middle class in urban areas cherish it. Most Thai citizens will never be fully participating members in the democratic polity if they are still poorly educated, earn miserable wages, and exploited in many ways. This problem is the most serious challenge for democrats who want to turn Thailand into a genuinely democratic country.
So this is where the greatest danger to the fragile Thai democracy lies. The tug of war between the military and the middle class represent indeed a tiny fraction of the Thai population as a whole. Most Thais in the rural areas are still unaware or vaguely aware of what happened on Ratchadamnoen Avenue in May, 1992. The most urgent task is then to bring these poor majority into the democratic process, into the struggle for just procedures, and this would not be possible if they are undereducated and exploited. The law will have to stipulate clearly that such action as exploitation of the poor on their ignorance is to be dealt with. If the majority are opted out of the public deliberative process, then they will become mere tools in the power struggles between the elites, either by the middle class or by the military-bureaucrats. Either way democracy will be impossible. The majority clearly needs to be able to compare and judge from among the various cultural traditions, an ability which has been possible now for the urban middle class. This ability would not be possible if the majority are not empowered by genuine protection of their legal rights and education which will help them understand their situations and those of other cultures. Without the poor being included in the democratic system and treated as rational and respectable agents of moral discernment, democracy in Thailand will be nothing more than a charade.
The goal to struggle for is represented by a situation where differences political or economic beliefs or interests could be fairly and equitably adjudicated through a procedure that is agreed to by all. Sectors with conflicting interests, for example the laborers and their employers, could then stand on equal ground in political matters and find a way to settle their differences in structurally the same manner as the settlement between adherents of different religious beliefs in the typically Thai manner--that is, actual contents of each religion, or the actual positions of the parties are inconsequential, and the conflicts are settled on the recognition that each side is respectable and rational as deliberative agents. The condition of possibility of such rational deliberation is that, apart from the theoretical presupposition that each side is to be regarded as respectable and rational, the actual situation of the parties engaging in debates has to be such that there is no other feasible way of dealing with each other save regarding each side as respectable and rational. That is to say, the situation of the laborers entering into debates with the employers, or farmers debating with the ruling bureaucrats must not already be crippled by the laborers' or farmers' ignorance or by the vestigial belief that the employers or bureaucrats are patrons who possess good karma and whom they have to depend on totally. Moreover, the legal structure of the country and its enforcement must be such that no party in such a debate gains unfair advantage over another. The farmers then have to be aware that they are indeed equal to the employers as citizens who are fully entitled to equal rights and protection under the law. This awareness, unfortunately, is still rather uncommon especially among the Thai rural majority, for most of them apparently are still bound by the old belief in their dependence on powerful patrons or by the misguided Buddhist belief in the "good" karma of the local rulers, making the employers "inherently fit" to lord over themselves. This need for reorientation in beliefs and thinking is one that the Thai democrats have to struggle for most resolutely.
In conclusion, then, the struggle toward greater democracy in Thailand has to start first from the realization that a traditional saying of the Thai people--that of recognizing that all religions are of equal merit, since they all teach people to be good--should be carried over into the political arena. That is to say, each side in the debate realizes that a total settlement of conflict, where each part comes to see "the absolute truth" of the matter, is impossible. Thus a fair way of cooperation is required which is non-violent and based on the awareness that each side has its own good, in the same way as the realization that each religion is equally good. Moreover, the interest of the poor and underprivileged majority of the country needs to be accounted for urgently, for democracy will be doomed if they are excluded from the process. What is demanded is that they be fully and adequately educated so that they earn more for their living and so that they learn about what it is to be a member of a democratic polity, and that the rule of law be fully implemented. These changes have not been a tradition in Thailand, but nevertheless they are realizable as all the other aspects of Thai culture which have been adapted and altered due to changing circumstances.